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Shine a Light: 
How Firm Responses to Announcing Earnings Restatements  
Changed After Sarbanes-Oxley 
 
Abstract 
We explore how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 created pressure for firms to take more visible 
and costly corrective action following the announcement of an earnings restatement. Building on 
theory about focusing events, the institutional effects of legislative change, and the agenda-
setting role of the media, we propose that Sarbanes-Oxley created reactive normative pressure on 
firms that announce earnings restatements, increasing the likelihood of CEO replacement in their 
aftermath. We theorize that Sarbanes-Oxley changed the meaning – and therefore the impact – of 
media coverage of earnings restatements. Our findings show that firm behavior after Sarbanes-
Oxley did change in ways that are consistent with the intent of the legislation: to increase 
executives’ accountability for the reliability of their firms’ financial statements. Moreover, we 
show this change is a result both of the direct effect of the legislation on increasing CEO 
accountability as well as through intensifying the effect of the media spotlight on misconduct.  
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A long tradition of research in organizational theory and organizational sociology has 
investigated how legislation influences the behavior of firms. Largely, this work has focused on 
the direct and indirect ways that new laws compel firms to behave in ways that signify their 
compliance to them (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995). Yet 
studying only how firms comply with legal requirements leaves us with an incomplete 
understanding of the influence of legislation over firm behavior. Firms that violate the law must 
also cope with new legislative environments. Given the pervasiveness of firms’ non-compliance 
with legal and regulatory requirements (estimates suggest that as many as 14.5% of firms 
commit fraud annually, see Dyck et al. 2013), it is important to understand how legislation 
affects the behavior of firms that violate laws, as well as those that comply with them. 
At the same time, research on the effect of legislation on firm behavior often focuses on 
the legislation per se, neglecting the role of other factors in the broader social context in which 
the legislation was enacted. To understand the consequences of legislative change 
comprehensively, it is necessary to investigate not only its direct effects, but also the ways in 
which it alters the effects of other social forces on firm behavior.  
In this paper, we explore how the behavior of firms that announce earnings restatements 
changes after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Specifically, we propose that the 
legislation was effective in increasing the Chief Executive Officer’s (CEO) accountability for the 
reliability of their firm’s financial statements, in two ways. First, we predict the legislation had a 
direct effect on the likelihood that firms would replace their CEO after announcing an earnings 
restatement. We expect that firms that announced an earnings restatement – an acknowledgement 
that previously reported Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings were materially 
incorrect – were more likely to replace their CEO, a particularly costly and highly visible signal 
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of change, after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley than they were before the legislative change. 
Second, we predict that the legislation altered the effect of the media in driving firm behavior. 
Specifically, we expect that Sarbanes-Oxley amplified the influence of media attention on 
individual firms’ misconduct on the likelihood of CEO change. Taken together, these predictions 
make an argument that Sarbanes-Oxley not only affected the degree to which firms made CEOs 
accountable for accounting failures, but also changed how the media spotlight affected firm 
responses to them. In other words, new legislation changes the expectations of firms that have 
violated the law both directly and by changing how aspects of the broader social context, such as 
the media, affect firm behavior.  
We draw on the concept of focusing events to develop theory about how new legislation 
enacted in their aftermath intensifies the effect of the media spotlight on firm behavior. Focusing 
events are relatively rare and unpredictable yet visible and harmful scandals or disasters that 
often culminate in legislative change and make what would have previously been seen as a series 
of random and idiosyncratic episodes into concrete and salient social problems (Birkland, 1997). 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in mid-2002 following a raft of corporate accounting 
scandals, including Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing. These scandals represent a focusing 
event that problematized the issue of financial statement reliability, intensified media attention 
on the importance of sound financial reporting, and triggered Sarbanes-Oxley’s passage. While 
media coverage is an independent driver of firm behavior (Bednar 2012; Bednar et al. 2013; 
Dyck and Zingales 2002), our argument is not about the effect of the media per se, but rather that 
Sarbanes-Oxley reoriented the media spotlight toward specific firms’ financial irresponsibility 
and amplified its effect on firm responses to financial restatement announcements.   
Firm Responses to Earnings Restatements 5
We test our theory using data on firms that acknowledged misconduct by announcing 
earnings restatements for the first time between 1997 and 2006. Consistent with prior research on 
the effect of new legislation on firm behavior (Edelman and Suchman 1997; Delmas and Toffel 
2004; Wholey and Sanchez 1991), we demonstrate that the likelihood of CEO replacement after 
an earnings restatement announcement increased after Sarbanes-Oxley. More interestingly, we 
find that Sarbanes-Oxley’s passage positively moderates the effect of increased media attention 
on the likelihood of CEO replacement following those announcements. In other words, in the 
wake of Sarbanes-Oxley, media attention directed at firms’ irresponsible accounting practices 
mattered more in the decision to replace the CEO.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The Effect of New Legislation on Firm Behavior 
The direct and indirect effects of legislation on organizational behavior are themes of 
interest for researchers in the institutional tradition. Because large-scale legislative change alters 
the official rewards and sanctions for organizational practices and behaviors, it also subsequently 
changes organizational practice (Delmas and Toffel 2004; Wholey and Sanchez 1991; Haveman 
et al. 2001). In some cases, these changes result from the coercive pressure new legislation 
creates for firms, while in others they result from firms’ need to demonstrate symbolic 
compliance with the law. 
Coercive Pressure. New legislation generates coercive pressure on firms, affecting their 
calculations about what constitutes a rational response to material aspects of the law (Edelman 
and Suchman 1997). Such changes to firm behavior have been demonstrated in a number of 
studies of legislative change. For example, antitrust legislation led to a merger wave around the 
turn of the 20th century because it outlawed cooperation among firms (Dobbin and Dowd 2000). 
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Later, the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950 discouraged within-industry mergers and led to 
acquisitions associated with unrelated diversification (Fligstein 1990). Corresponding spates of 
merger activity follow the subsequent relaxation of antitrust enforcement throughout the 20th 
century (Stearns and Allan 1996). In a different setting, Wade and colleagues (1998) explore 
how state prohibition laws affected the founding and survival rates of beer brewers in the focal 
and neighboring states. These changes in firm behavior reflect substantive, rational responses to 
the coercive power of legislation.  
Proactive Normative Pressure. Firms can also respond to legislative change in more 
symbolic ways. Legislative change shifts the “cultural rules, models and mythologies” that affect 
organizational practice (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Edelman and Suchman 1997; Meyer and 
Rowan 1977), generating indirect, largely mimetic pressure for firms to respond in ways that 
signal their symbolic compliance. These pressures often lead to indirect outcomes that were 
unanticipated by the legislation’s crafters (Haveman et al. 2001; Merton 1936). These outcomes 
are more about conforming proactively to new norms than about responding to the law’s 
coercive force.  
As an example, organizations responded to Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) 
legislation by developing “gestures of compliance” (Edelman et al. 1999: 406): organizational 
solutions that mimicked but were not directly responsive to the law. The EEO law prohibited 
employment discrimination but made no reference to employers’ requirements to handle 
complaints. The internal grievance procedures most firms established, which might have 
appeared to be a rational response to the law, instead represent symbolic gestures of compliance 
to it. In finding a way to signal their compliance with the material aspects of the EEO law, 
organizations devised and diffused employment practices that were only indirectly related to it. 
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These practices reflected changing cultural norms and understandings of employment 
relationships that the law, in part, created (Dobbin et al. 1993). This kind of response is a result 
of what has been labeled the normative pressure1 legislation creates (Dobbin et al. 1993; 
Edelman 1990, 1992; Sutton et al. 1994).  
Reactive Normative Pressure. To date, the literature on legislative change has focused on 
how new legislation causes firms to take actions that – either substantively or symbolically – are 
consistent with the legislation’s intent. In this way, the focus has been on how new laws motivate 
firms to proactively meet the new requirements or norms they create. We know relatively little, 
however, about how legislative change affects the behavior of firms that have violated the law 
and can therefore no longer signal their active compliance to it. We argue that new legislation 
changes institutionally appropriate responses to violations of the law, just as it changes 
institutionally appropriate responses to conforming with it.  
We believe that following the enactment of new legislation, particularly legislation 
explicitly designed to limit misconduct, firms that acknowledge a violation of the law will be 
more likely to take costly and visible action to address the underlying causes of their 
malfeasance. In contrast to the proactive nature of the normative pressure described above 
(Dobbin et al. 1993; Edelman 1990, 1992; Sutton et al. 1994), we label the pressure firms face 
after violating a law in a new legislative environment reactive normative pressure.  
                                                 
1DiMaggio and Powell (1983) use the term normative isomorphism to describe the spread of practices through 
professionalization. We note that they might describe the response to the pressure we describe here as proactive 
normative pressure (symbolic inter-firm imitation) as mimetic isomorphism. Nevertheless, we follow the 
organizational sociologists who term the pressure to comply symbolically with new legislation, leading to the 
emergence of new norms, as normative pressure (Dobbin et al. 1993; Edelman 1990, 1992; Sutton et al. 1994). 
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Sarbanes-Oxley and CEO Change After Restatement Announcements 
We take up the question of how firms respond to the reactive normative pressure that 
legislative change creates using the case of firms announcing earnings restatements after the 
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. Earnings restatements are tantamount to revisions 
of a company’s history, and while they may result from legitimate errors, fraud, misapplication 
of accounting regulations, or manipulation of facts, it is often difficult to distinguish between 
intentional and unintentional misstatements (Wu 2002). Regardless of whether they represent 
fraud or simply violations of the letter of the law, restatement announcements are typically seen 
as admissions of negligence or misconduct, and are accompanied by market and non-market 
penalties, including significant losses of shareholder value (Akhigbe and Kudla 2005; Collins et 
al. 2005; Palmrose et al. 2004; Wu 2002), impaired credibility of future financial disclosures 
(Farber 2005), diminished expectations of future earnings, and subsequent increases in the cost 
of capital (Farber 2005; Hribar and Jenkins 2004).  
As with any potentially damaging disclosure, most firms seek to mitigate the negative 
consequences of a restatement announcement. Firms that have engaged in misconduct typically 
take steps to elicit more positive impressions from external stakeholders (Ashforth and Gibbs 
1990; Elsbach 1994; Zavyalova et al. 2012). Because stakeholders frequently attribute 
responsibility for wrongdoing to the Chief Executive, the actor ultimately accountable for firm 
action, CEO replacement is one of the most visible signals of a firm’s commitment to addressing 
the roots of the problem and is a well-documented response to revelations of organizational 
misconduct (Arthaud-Day et al. 2006; Desai et al. 2006; Srinivasan 2005; Cannella et al. 1995; 
Hennes et al. 2006; Tetlock 1985).  
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CEO replacement is also a costly undertaking that signals a commitment to change. 
Turnover among top managers incurs costs associated with executive search, socialization of 
new executives, and dismissal compensation, as well as costs associated with the disruption the 
change creates for boards of directors (Burks 2010; Wiersema 2002). In contrast to lower-cost, 
symbolic actions, such as announcing internal investigations, offering verbal accounts, or 
blaming third parties (Pozner 2007), replacing the CEO is a strong signal of a firm’s intent to 
address the underlying sources of wrongdoing (Agrawal et al. 1999; Wiesenfeld et al. 2008; 
Gomulya and Boeker 2014). Extensive research demonstrates that CEOs of firms that announce 
earnings restatements are replaced at a higher rate than their peers at firms that do not restate 
earnings (Hazarika et al. 2012; Hennes et al. 2006; Karpoff et al. 2008).  
We propose that the general tendency to replace CEOs after announcing earnings 
restatements will increase significantly after Sarbanes-Oxley’s enactment. The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act was designed to improve firms’ corporate governance and reduce the future likelihood of 
large-scale corporate frauds such as those that triggered the legislation. In the 15 years since it 
passed into law, we have learned a great deal about its effects on various aspects of firm 
behavior. For example, Sarbanes-Oxley increased the burden of financial reporting (Martin and 
Combs 2010) and raised the cost of launching a public offering (Engel et al. 2007), but, 
consistent with its intent, decreased the likelihood of earnings management (Cohen et al. 2005).  
At the same time, empirical evidence about the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on corporate 
leadership is relatively lacking. This gap is surprising, given that one of its primary objectives 
was to increase the accountability of senior leaders for the reliability of their firm’s financial 
statements, and as such its provisions place significant pressure on firms to penalize senior 
leadership in the wake of corporate earnings restatements. Section 906 of the Act contains 
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provisions requiring the CEO and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) to certify the integrity of 
their firms’ publicly-filed financial statements, making executives directly and legally 
accountable for the actions of their firms. In light of these provisions, the legislation ought to 
have heightened expectations of appropriate corporate governance and made CEO replacement a 
particularly salient signal of commitment to change, sound management, and oversight 
(Goranova and Ryan 2014; Gomulya and Boeker 2016; Hillman et al. 2011).  
To be clear, Sarbanes-Oxley does not require any executive to be replaced in the wake of 
financial impropriety, so this is not a story about the Act’s coercive force. Rather, by naming the 
CEO as the actor ultimately responsible for the accuracy of a firm’s financial reporting, the 
legislation creates reactive normative pressure on firms to take remedial action that is more 
visible and costlier than what they might have done previously. While it is possible that firms 
replace their CEO after misconduct because the CEO is, in fact, culpable, there is no reason to 
expect that CEOs are more culpable after a legislative change than they were before. 
Nevertheless, because Sarbanes-Oxley increased top executives’ accountability for the veracity 
of their firms’ financial statements, and because it has the specific goal of limiting corporate 
misconduct and improving corporate transparency, we expect that firms will be more likely to 
replace their CEO following the announcement of a financial restatement after the legislation 
was enacted than they were before. We consider this effect a response to the reactive normative 
pressure that the legislation created for firms that have violated the law. 
H1. Firms that announce earnings restatements after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley are 
more likely to replace their CEO than firms that announce earnings restatements before 
the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. 
The Effect of Media Attention on Firm Behavior  
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The news media have an important influence on firm behavior independent of the 
legislative environment in which they operate. By disseminating information, uncovering new 
information through independent investigation, and publicizing the opinions of influential 
stakeholders, the media play a key role in setting the agenda for what the public cares about 
(Bednar 2012; Aguilera et al. 2015; Bushee et al. 2010; McCombs and Shaw 1972; McCombs 
2005). Specifically, they help audiences make sense of firm behavior (Deephouse and Heugens 
2009; Pfarrer et al. 2010; Tewksbury and Scheufele 2007), and shape audience perceptions of 
firm actions (Kennedy 2008; Deephouse 2000).  
Several studies provide substantial evidence that generalized media attention towards 
given topics represent an important source of influence over firm behavior. The media help 
adjudicate what behavior is considered acceptable (Suchman 1995) and unacceptable (Bednar et 
al. 2013; Greve et al. 2010), and thus generate social approval for or condemnation of firm 
behavior (Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Pollock and Rindova 2003). Consequently, positive 
media coverage conveys benefits in terms of firm legitimacy and reputation (Rao 1994; David 
2000), while critical coverage of firms seen to fall short of audience standards and behavioral 
expectations results in commensurate penalties (Farrell and Whidbee 2002; Reuber and Fischer 
2010). The influence of the media over firm behavior implies that it functions as a watchdog, 
ensuring firms maintain decent standards of corporate governance (Dyck et al. 2008; Aguilera et 
al. 2015; Bednar 2012; Liu and McConnell 2013).  
When media attention pinpoints specific, illustrative instances of problematic firm 
behavior, the pressure on those spotlighted firms to remedy their problematic behavior becomes 
intense. For example, media coverage of a firm’s pollution is associated with a decrease in its 
likelihood of future polluting (Jia et al. 2016), media coverage of a firm’s social responsibility 
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efforts positively affects its later social and environmental disclosures (Islam and Deegan 2010), 
media coverage of the ineffectiveness of a firm’s board forces that firm to take corrective action 
(Joe et al. 2009), and increases in press coverage of firms’ corporate governance violations 
increases the likelihood that a firm will reverse its controversial practices (Dyck et al. 2008).  
In sum, the amount of media coverage devoted to firm improprieties determines the 
degree to which firms feel pressured to signal their commitment to change (McDonnell and King 
2013; King 2008). In contrast, those overlooked by the press are less motivated to engage in 
costly action (Farrell and Whidbee 2002; Bednar 2012; Bednar et al. 2013). When a firm is 
perceived to have violated a new legal requirement, media pressure will intensify the reactive 
normative pressure it experiences. Building on evidence that firms implicated in scandals are 
more likely to replace their CEOs as a function of the generalized level of media attention about 
a topic (Wiersema and Zhang 2013), we predict that the likelihood of CEO change will increase 
as media attention focuses on a particular firm’s wrongdoing.  
H2. The more media attention directed toward a given firm’s earnings restatement 
announcement, the more likely that firm is to replace its CEO.   
How Sarbanes-Oxley Amplifies the Effect of Media Attention on Firm Behavior 
Missing from the discussion of the effect of the media on firm behavior is an 
understanding of whether media attention always affects firms the same way. We propose that 
after the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, media attention towards a given firm’s financial 
restatement meant something different, becoming more influential in motivating a substantial 
corporate response, than it did before. We support this argument using Birkland’s (1997) concept 
of focusing events: highly disruptive, relatively rare occurrences that are ex ante unpredictable 
and suggest harm or the possibility of future harms. Focusing events bring new problems to light, 
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elevating attention around a particularly vexing trend and problematizing it for the public. As a 
result, focusing events are highly salient to policy makers, social control agents, and the public 
simultaneously (Birkland 1997; Birkland and Lawrence 2009).  
Focusing events also lead to legislative action. Birkland (1997, 2006) describes several 
examples of focusing events that generated large-scale legislative change, including the 1979 
Three Mile Island nuclear accident, the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, and the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 (Birkland 2006). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is another example of legislative 
change initiated in the wake of a focusing event: the series of highly visible corporate accounting 
frauds that caused major bankruptcies, as well as two spectacular indictments of the CEOs of 
major corporations on criminal charges, within the short time period between December 2001 
and July 2002. Of the 20 largest bankruptcies in the U.S. through 2007 (the end of our study 
period), five were due to accounting fraud; three of these (Enron, WorldCom, and Global 
Crossing) occurred within the 18-month period preceding the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, as did 
the very public indictments of Dennis Kozlowski, CEO of Tyco, and John Rigas, CEO of 
Adelphia. The density of these scandals within the 18-month period depicted in Figure 1 
represent a focusing event that ultimately led to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley.  
----- Insert Figure 1 about here ----- 
Focusing events do more than increase attention to a given issue, they also critically 
change what attention towards that issue means. Before these scandals broke, a firm announcing 
an earnings restatement was not particularly noteworthy, and earnings restatements were 
reported as one-off, disconnected, or random occurrences. Once the press identified earnings 
restatements as a social problem, however, specific instances of potential financial misconduct at 
individual firms became more meaningful and interesting. For example, on November 9, 2001, 
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the New York Times wrote a story reporting that Enron needed to restate its financials, having 
overstated profits by $600 million over the previous five years, yet the rest of the article reports 
in a rather upbeat tone about ongoing negotiations for an acquisition by Dynergy (Oppel and 
Sorkin 2001). By 2003, articles in the Times about restatements read like the preface to a thriller:  
Financial accounting has gone squishy underfoot, and ''restatement'' is the business 
word of our time. Corporate America has announced billions in restatements as 
accounting has begun to look like a black art, with profits dissolving as if by a 
magical curse. (Schwartz 2003) 
Once it was clear that the dry topic of a firm revising its financial records could explode into 
Enron-type scandal, the media began to attend much more closely to any given firm’s financial 
restatements, and — critically — that attention alluded to much more vicious intent and 
catastrophic potential.  
Thus, Sarbanes-Oxley supplied a new lens through which to make sense of organizational 
wrongdoing, changing the meaning and consequently the effect of media attention on firm 
responses to earnings restatement announcements. This suggests that the passage of Sarbanes-
Oxley amplified the direct effect of media attention on the likelihood of CEO change. We 
therefore hypothesize that the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley positively moderates the effect of 
media attention on firms announcing earnings restatements, increasing the likelihood that they 
will replace their CEO.  
H3. Sarbanes-Oxley positively moderates the effect of media attention on the likelihood 
of CEO replacement after the announcement of a financial restatement, such that the 
effect of media attention on the likelihood of CEO replacement is amplified after 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s enactment. 
A model of the relationships we hypothesize among legislative change, media attention to 
wrongdoing, and the likelihood of CEO turnover is presented in Figure 2.  
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----- Insert Figure 2 about here ----- 
DATA AND ANALYSIS 
Empirical setting  
We examine corporate responses to the announcement of an earnings restatement 
between 1997 and 2006, representing the period in which earnings restatements became a 
significant aspect of corporate life in the United States. In 2006, an estimated 1,420 U.S. public 
companies restated earnings, a full ten percent of publicly traded companies (Harris 2007; Scholz 
2008). This observation window straddles the periods before and after the focusing event of 
corporate meltdowns in 2001 and 2002 and the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the 
summer of 2002. Among other provisions, the Act outlines detailed disclosure requirements for 
publicly traded firms, regulates the governance of firms’ relationships with their external 
auditors, assigns personal liability to directors, and requires the CEO and CFO to verify the 
authenticity and accuracy of their firm’s financial statements personally. We examine the 
likelihood of a firm replacing its CEO in the wake of announcing an earnings restatement before 
and after the passage of the Act. 
Sample 
Our sample of restating firms comes from two databases issued by the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO). The first report covers restatements announced between January 
1, 1997 and June 30, 2002 (U.S. GAO 2003), and the second covers restatements announced 
between July 1, 2002 and June 30, 2006 (U.S. GAO 2006). The GAO excludes all restatements 
resulting from routine corrections that might be driven by a change in accounting practices or 
bookkeeping errors. As such, the GAO database only includes cases due to “so-called 
‘aggressive’ accounting practices, intentional and unintentional misuse of facts applied to 
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financial statements, oversight or misinterpretation of accounting rules, and fraud” (U.S. GAO 
2002: 72). In other words, both the U.S. government and a wide range of other researchers 
perceive these firms to have engaged in misconduct (Arthaud-Day et al. 2006; Harris and 
Bromiley 2007; Pfarrer et al. 2008b; Prechel and Morris 2010). Together those data comprise 
2,309 restatement announcements covering a decade.  
Of the sample identified by the GAO, complete data on all the study variables, with the 
exception of governance data, were available for 412 firms. To avoid artificially inflating the 
number of observations, we include only the first restatement for each firm in our analysis. One 
hundred and nine firms in our sample announced more than one restatement during the 
observation window; including multiple restatements of the same firm as separate observations 
would nearly double the sample size without introducing new information to the models. In 
analyses that include governance variables, our sample comprises 260 firms about which we 
were able to collect more detailed information. This restricted sample is a function of the fact 
that many of the firms in our sample are quite small and not covered by Execucomp, upon which 
we relied for our governance data.2 Nevertheless, this sample compares favorably with those 
used by other researchers with similar datasets. For example, Gomulya and Boeker (2014) have a 
sample of 352 restating firms; Gomulya and Boeker (2016) have a sample of 500 restatements; 
Cowen and Marcel (2011) and Marcel and Cowen (2014) each test a sample of 63 restatements.  
Measures 
 Dependent Variable. We test firm responses to restatement announcements using the 
binary variable CEO Change, which takes the value of 1 if the CEO was replaced within the year 
(365-day period) following the restatement announcement and 0 otherwise. CEO change was 
                                                 
2 T-tests (available upon request) reveal the only differences in the variables of interest between firms with 
governance data and those without are related to firm size. 
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coded based on corporate 8-K filings with the SEC, which describe the departure of certain 
corporate officers. We confirmed the timing of such changes through media reports from public 
sources.  
In supplementary analyses, we compare the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on CEO change to 
its effect on auditor change. Thus, we also used these filings to create a variable indicating 
Auditor Change, a dummy taking the value of 1 if the focal firm changed its external auditor in 
the 365 days following the restatement announcement, and 0 otherwise.  
 Independent Variables. Our primary independent variable is Post-Sarbanes-Oxley. This 
dummy variable was given a value of 1 if the restatement was announced after the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act was signed into law on July 30, 2002, and 0 if announced prior to that date.  
Our second independent variable, Restatement Media Coverage (logged) captures the 
logged count of newspaper articles published about the focal firm that included the word 
“restatement” or one its variants in the year (365-day period) following the restatement 
announcement or until the day before the CEO replacement was announced, whichever came 
first. For firms that replaced their CEO, we ended the search the day before the firm announced 
its CEO’s departure; doing so ensures that we do not artificially inflate our count of media hits 
by eliminating mentions that are likely to deal with the CEO change rather than the restatement 
announcement. We used the Lexis-Nexis Academic database of newspapers to calculate this 
measure, dropping duplicates using the database’s de-duplicate function, and restricting our 
search to U.S. newspapers.  
We also collected two measures of attention to use in the first stage of a two-step 
Heckman procedure in our analyses (see Empirical Strategy). To account for the fact that media 
coverage and attention reflects as well as predicts firm action (Bednar 2012: 140), we created a 
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dummy variable from our measure of restatement media coverage that takes the value of 1 if the 
firm received any media coverage of its restatement in the year (365-day period) following the 
restatement announcement (Any Restatement Media Coverage), and 0 otherwise. We also 
collected data on the Number of Analysts that covered the firm over the prior year, as a measure 
of the general level of attention a firm received.  
 Control Variables. We included six measures of the seriousness of the restatement to 
ensure that our independent variables are capturing the variance in CEO change attributable to 
the act of announcing a restatement, rather than to seriousness of restatement itself, following 
previous studies (Arthaud-Day et al. 2006; Hennes et al. 2008; Srinivasan 2005). Restatement 
Increased Net Income, a dummy indicating that the restatement resulted in an increase in net 
income, was included because such restatements generally elicit less severe penalties than those 
that decrease net income (Akhigbe and Kudla 2005). Net Effect of Restatement represents the 
absolute value of the effect of the restatement on firm net income, logged in dollars. We include 
it because the overall effect of a restatement on net income affects market responses to 
restatement announcements (Feroz et al. 1991; Srinivasan 2005). These data were drawn from 
restatement filings, annual reports, 10Ks, 10Qs, proxy statements and other filings from the 
SEC’s EDGAR database. We include fixed effects for a firm’s industry in all of our models using 
1-digit SIC codes. 
We included a dummy variable for the most egregious form of restatements, Restatement 
Due to Fraud, which typically results in particularly adverse outcomes relative to other types of 
restatements (Hennes et al. 2008; Palmrose et al. 2004; Wilson 2008). We coded restatement 
type by comparing designations assigned by the GAO to firms’ restatement filings with the SEC 
and adjusting accordingly. We also created a variable for Restatement Resulted in a Lawsuit 
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using the Stanford Shareholder Lawsuit Database, a dummy taking on a value of 0 if no 
shareholder lawsuits were filed and 1 otherwise. To control for how commonplace, and therefore 
taken-for-granted or unusual, a given announcement is, we collected data on Number of Firms 
Restating, Prior Year, a count of the number of public firms announcing restatements each year, 
collected from a U.S. Treasury report (Scholz 2008).  
We also collected data on the firms themselves. Firm Size is a measure of logged total 
assets in millions, lagged by one year. S&P 500 is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the restating 
firm was included in the S&P 500 in the year the restatement was announced, and a 0 if it was 
not. Both variables were collected using the CRSP/Compustat merged database. We account for 
firm performance, with the expectation that CEOs of poorly performing firms were more likely 
to be fired than CEOs of firms experiencing financial success. Earnings Per Share, a standard 
measure of firm financial health, was collected from the CRSP/Compustat merged database.  
 Finally, because CEO departure is by its very nature an ambiguous event, we collected 
data on CEO and governance characteristics using the Execucomp database to try to account for 
other reasons why the CEO may have been replaced. Research on the relationship between board 
independence and CEO compensation (e.g., Boyd, 1994; Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Fich and 
White 2003; Weisbach, 1988) suggests that more powerful, highly paid CEOs may be less likely 
to depart following revelations of misconduct. Thus, we include data on CEO Compensation, 
which we introduce into our models as a logged term, as a proxy of the CEO’s status, power, and 
importance to the firm. In addition, CEOs at the end of their careers might be more willing or 
likely to depart a firm after misconduct is revealed. Thus, we gathered data CEO Age to take the 
CEO’s career stage into account. Including CEO age in the models also helps control for 
departure that represents a normal retirement and succession process (e.g., Murphy 1999; 
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Weisbach 1988; Huson et al. 2001). Finally, we coded whether the CEO replacement 
announcement included references to the CEO’s Resignation or Retirement, in contrast to other 
explanations for CEO turnover, to gauge the likelihood that the turnover might have been either 
voluntary or part of a planned retirement and succession process. Since a degree of symbolic 
management accompanies high-level staff changes (Pozner 2007), these disclosures are likely 
not entirely reliable. Nevertheless, they give us an idea of how the focal firm is making sense of 
the departure. Finally, there is a stronger, negative relationship between firm performance and 
CEO turnover among firms with smaller boards (e.g., Jensen 1993; Yermack 1996; Huson et al. 
2001; Zajac and Westphal 1996). Thus, we also control for Board Size, which is calculated as the 
total number of both inside and outside directors on the focal firm’s board.  
Empirical Strategy 
We hypothesize (H1) a main effect for Sarbanes-Oxley on CEO change after a 
restatement announcement, (H2) a main effect for media attention on CEO change after a 
restatement announcement, and, critically, (H3) that the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley will 
amplify the effect of media attention on CEO change. Media attention, however, may both 
reflect the future prospect of CEO change as well as influence it (Bednar 2012: 140), leading to 
concerns about selection. Even with the extensive set of variables we include as controls, there 
are legitimate reasons to worry about this source of endogeneity. To address this, we use a two-
stage Heckman procedure for our primary analysis (Guilhem 2008; Heckman 1979). This model 
first predicts the likelihood of a firm’s restatement announcement receiving any media coverage 
using a probit model, and then controls for that likelihood in a second-stage regression. This 
approach, consistent with Bednar (2012), lets us account the fact that the media attention a firm 
receives is not random.  
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In the first stage of this model, we include all of the variables that were significantly 
related to the likelihood of media attention (Restatement Increased Net Income, Net Effect of 
Restatement, Restatement Due to Fraud, Number of Firms Restating Prior Year, Firm Size, 
S&P500, CEO Compensation, and SIC code), and one variable that is excluded from the second 
stage (Number of Analysts, Prior Year) because it is correlated with media attention but not CEO 
change. The results from the first-stage probit (available from the authors upon request) include a 
calculation of the inverse Mills ratio (Lambda), which controls for this source of sample 
selection bias. We use this ratio (Lambda) in the second stage model to account for the fact that 
there might be systematic differences between firms that receive attention by the media and firms 
that do not (i.e., a firm’s media attention is not random). The media attention variable in our full 
models thus accounts for its unique impact on the likelihood of CEO change, correcting for any 
systematic differences between firms that are subject to media attention and firms that are not.  
In all models, we include industry fixed effects at the 1-digit SIC level as well as a linear 
time trend.  
Results 
We report descriptive statistics and correlations among all variables in Table 1.  
----- Insert Table 1 about here ----- 
Table 2 reports the second stage of our Heckman two-stage model, predicting the 
likelihood of CEO dismissal based on the joint effects of the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley and 
media coverage. For ease of interpretation, we interpret the odds-ratio coefficients of the main 
effects at their means. In model 1, we test Hypothesis 1 using our full sample. Model 1 reveals 
that the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on the likelihood of CEO replacement after an earnings 
restatement announcement is positive and significant (p<0.01).  
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----- Insert Table 2 about here ----- 
Model 2 tests Hypothesis 2, which predicts a main effect of media attention on the 
likelihood of CEO dismissal. The effect of Restatement Media Coverage (logged) is not 
significant in this model, providing no support for Hypothesis 2. Nevertheless, because this result 
may be an artefact of our empirical strategy, which conditions our results on the likelihood of 
receiving any media coverage and weights our observations accordingly, we ran an additional 
test of Hypothesis 2 using simple logistic regression. The results of three different specifications 
of this analysis are presented in Table 3. Our findings suggest that any media coverage 
mentioning a firm’s announcement of a restatement of earnings increases the likelihood of CEO 
dismissal (p<0.10) and that the more media coverage there is of a particular firm’s restatement, 
the more likely it is to replace its CEO (p<0.05). This analysis provides support for the assertion 
that attention to financial misconduct increases the likelihood CEO replacement, in line with 
previous findings (Wiersema and Zhang 2013). 
----- Insert Table 3 about here ----- 
We include the main effects of both Sarbanes-Oxley and media coverage in model 3 of 
Table 2, with no change to the significance or general magnitude of either effect. To test 
Hypothesis 3, we add the interaction of Restatement Media Coverage (logged) and Post-
Sarbanes-Oxley in model 4 of Table 2 and find that the interaction positively and significantly 
(p<0.05) affects the likelihood of CEO replacement. Figure 3 depicts the interaction by plotting 
the effect of Restatement Media Coverage (logged) on the likelihood of CEO replacement 
following an earnings restatement announcement both before (dotted line) and after (dashed line) 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s enactment. 
----- Insert Figure 3 about here ----- 
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In models 5 through 8 of Table 2 we report results for models that include our corporate 
governance controls. Lack of data availability on many of the small firms included in our 
analysis reduces our sample in this step from 412 firms to 260 firms. Model 5 shows that the 
effect of the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley is large, positive (0.701), and statistically significant 
(p<0.001), providing support again for our hypothesis that the passage of the legislation has a 
direct effect on the likelihood of removing the CEO after a restatement announcement. In model 
6, we enter the effect of media attention alone, which again is not significant, and model 7 
includes both main effects. Model 8 includes the interaction of Post-Sarbanes-Oxley and 
Restatement Media Coverage (logged), which again is significant and positive (p<0.001), 
providing support for our argument that that media attention amplifies the effect of the passage 
of Sarbanes-Oxley on the likelihood of CEO dismissal.  
Robustness Checks 
Costliness and visibility. We have argued that firms are more likely to replace their CEOs 
after Sarbanes-Oxley, in part because it intensified the media spotlight on firms announcing 
earnings restatements, and CEO change carries symbolic weight as a costly and visible response 
to reactive normative pressure. It could be argued, however, that changing any actor involved in 
financial statement preparation and verification might be amplified after Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
passage, particularly when the earnings restatement announcement receives significant media 
attention. Moreover, one might argue that this is not at all a symbolic management technique, but 
rather a rational assessment of culpability in the wake of monitoring system failures. To test this 
alternative explanation, we modeled another corporate action that might represent a more direct 
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response to the reactive normative pressures that follow earnings restatement announcements 
after Sarbanes-Oxley: changing the external auditor.  
External auditors are responsible for ensuring the quality of financial disclosures and 
uncovering shortcomings or material errors, and so are directly responsible for the certification 
of the financial statements of the firms which employ them. Moreover, in its effort to ensure 
transparency and accuracy in financial statements, Sarbanes-Oxley has several provisions 
relevant to auditor independence and oversight. Following an earnings restatement 
announcement, therefore, it is not unreasonable for a firm to place accountability for material 
errors on its external auditor, and make an auditor change accordingly.  
We replicate our analysis of the likelihood of CEO replacement in Table 4, using the 
same procedure and independent variables, to predict the likelihood of auditor replacement. 
Model 1 excludes governance controls and model 2 includes them. We find no significant 
relationship between the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, media coverage, or their interaction on the 
likelihood of external auditor replacement following Sarbanes-Oxley’s passage. This result 
provides support for our assertion that Sarbanes-Oxley creates reactive normative pressure on 
firm to take visible and costly action (changing the CEO rather than the auditor) in the wake of 
announcing misconduct and amplifies the influence of media attention to given firms’ earnings 
restatements on CEO replacement.  
----- Insert Table 4 about here ----- 
Timing. So far, we have used the date on which Sarbanes-Oxley was officially passed by 
Congress (July 30, 2002), as a precise date that differentiates our two groups of restatement 
announcers. This choice might bias our results for two reasons. First, the legislation had been 
debated very publicly for several months before its passage, as well as received a great deal of 
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media attention. Thus, firms knew about the proposed changes in advance of the legislation’s 
formal passage and might have altered their behavior in anticipation of the legislative change. In 
addition, some firms may have timed their restatement announcements strategically. Although 
SEC regulations stipulate that firms must file a form 8-K and make a public announcement 
within four days of determining that an earnings statement needs to be amended, which formally 
restricts their discretion over timing, it is possible that some firms bent the rules to their 
advantage. 
To rule out the influence of strategic firm behavior around the date of Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
passage, we conducted additional analyses on restricted samples, where we exclude firms that 
announced earnings restatements within three months and six months on either side of the July 
30, 2002 date. We report results for each of these restricted samples, excluding and including 
governance controls, in models 3 through 6 of Table 4. Models 3 and 4 exclude firms that 
announced earnings restatements within the period spanning three months before to three months 
after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. Models 5 and 6 exclude firms that announced restatements 
within a six-month window before and after the legislation’s passage. Our results are consistent 
with our primary analysis, such that the interaction of Sarbanes-Oxley and media attention 
significantly predict (p<0.05) an increased likelihood of CEO replacement. These results suggest 
that any strategic timing of the restatement announcement does not mitigate the joint impact of 
media attention and the legislation on the likelihood of CEO change.  
DISCUSSION  
We investigate how firms that acknowledge misconduct by announcing an earnings 
restatement respond to these revelations following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a 
large-scale legislative action designed to curb corporate misconduct. We argue that the 
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accounting scandals in the 2000-2002 period represent a focusing event (Birkland 1997, 2006) 
that initiated a tectonic shift in the social understanding of organizational wrongdoing. This 
focusing event led to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, creating reactive normative pressure on 
firms perceived to have violated the law. Ultimately, after Sarbanes-Oxley’s enactment, firms 
respond to announcements of financial malfeasance with more visible, costly action (CEO 
replacement), and are more sensitive to media attention towards their restatement 
announcements, than they were prior to this tectonic shift. 
Our analysis provides support for the assertion that the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley 
heightened CEO accountability for their firms’ financial restatements, both directly and by 
amplifying the effect of media attention on firm behavior. It also demonstrates that it is not a 
reaction to the new norms created by the law that altered the pattern of observed firm response to 
misconduct. Rather, these findings suggest that the legislative change ultimately gave the media 
spotlight a new lens through which news of financial misconduct was interpreted publicly.  
Our findings are significant for a number of reasons. First, they help broaden our 
understanding of the ways in which legislative change affects firm behavior. Although much 
research has demonstrated that new legislation has both coercive and normative effects on the 
structure of markets and firm practices, our study is the first to explore the ways in which 
legislative change affects the behavior of firms that are already perceived to have violated the 
law. Our study helps explain how new legislation designed to limit firm misconduct changes 
how firms respond to perceived violations of the law.  
Second, our study points to an important link missing in the current literature: the way in 
which new laws change how firms respond to aspects of the social environment. While extant 
research has been thorough in enumerating the costs of misconduct to firms and individuals 
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associated with them, it has so far paid less attention to how firms respond to the societal 
mechanisms driving such costs, as well as how firms respond to other societal pressures after 
announcing misconduct, notably media attention. Our findings suggest new laws can change how 
factors within the social context influence firm behavior, in our case the effect of media coverage 
of individual firms’ misconduct on the likelihood of CEO change. In other words, it is not only 
features of the firm and the misconduct that dictate firm reactions to revelations of malfeasance, 
but also the effect of legislation on the importance of media attention to firm behavior.  
Our research also contributes to the literature on symbolic management and institutional 
theory. We extend the symbolic management literature by specifying triggers of CEO change in 
an effort to remediate firms’ reputations. Changing the CEO is one of many options available to 
firms interested in managing external stakeholder impressions. Further research into the factors 
that promote the use of less costly measures, or that make CEO change even more costly, may 
provide further insight into firm decision-making processes. Similarly, considering the frequency 
of CEO change relative to auditor change, which has less symbolic heft but makes a clearer 
connection to the forces underlying financial misconduct, identifies some of the trade-offs 
inherent in reactive normative responses to legislative infractions, and highlights the more 
symbolic nature of such acts. 
We have not been able to rule out one important plausible alternative explanation for our 
results. It could be that firms that announce a restatement are more likely to replace their CEOs 
after Sarbanes-Oxley because they are truly more interested in assigning executive accountability 
for restatements to the heads of the firm. It is possible that boards think the CEO ought to be held 
responsible for wrongdoing within his firm, leading to an increased likelihood of CEO dismissal. 
Moreover, it is possible that these assessments are independent of media coverage and public 
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discourse, so that the CEOs would depart even absent increased media coverage. Though this is 
not an unreasonable explanation, the empirical evidence we provide regarding the moderating 
effect of the legislative change on media attention counters it fairly convincingly. 
We also note that our governance controls did not significantly predict the likelihood of 
CEO turnover. We believe that the lack of a significant relationship here suggests that turnover 
among our sampled firms is not merely the result of normal executive-board dynamics and 
political behavior, as would be predicted by previous research (e.g., Huson et al. 2001; Jensen 
1993; Weisbach 1988; Zajac and Westphal 1996). Instead, the absence of significant results here 
suggests that the processes driving change in top management following misconduct have more 
to do with institutional pressure than internal firm dynamics, supporting our central hypotheses.  
Generalizability and Future Research 
We believe our findings will generalize to a broad range of legislative actions, 
particularly those triggered by focusing events or large scale social change. That legislative 
change affects firm behavior is not a new idea, and findings from that stream of literature 
confirm that legislative change affects firm behavior in coercive and proactively normative ways. 
We extend this literature by suggesting that legislation also affects the behavior of firms 
perceived to be in violation of the law, through reactive normative pressure. Nevertheless, it is 
reasonable to ask whether all legislative changes engender similar reactive normative pressure on 
firms, or if reactive normative pressure is felt more keenly after legislation enacted following a 
focusing event. Our findings suggest that media attention that follows a focusing event will elicit 
a more intense reaction from firms. While we do not have evidence on which to base an 
empirical conclusion, we suspect that legislation born out of other types of political discourse 
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may engender less reactive normative pressure than legislation that follows a focusing event. 
This question remains an open question ripe for future research. 
Our findings also open avenues for future research about the downstream consequences 
of CEO change after announcing an earning restatement, a topic that has yet to be addressed 
(Pozner and Harris 2016). Is the gesture effective in remedying the firm’s reputation (Pfarrer et 
al. 2008a)?  Does it lead to more friendly coverage by the media or stock market analysts? Does 
symbolic action in the wake of legislative change reduce the likelihood of future misconduct, 
suggesting that it is more substantial than window dressing? Investigating such questions would 
elucidate whether the reactive normative response is, in fact, a rational one.  
Though we know much about the ways in which firms strive to appear to conform to the 
law, either symbolically or substantively, this paper is the first to address how firms that violate 
the law react to legislative change. When we fail to investigate the dark side of firm behavior – 
misconduct, corruption, fraud, and their consequences – we are left with an incomplete 
understanding of a major component of firm life. Ultimately, our findings contribute nuance to 
our understanding of the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley, the sociology of legislative change, the 
relationship between the media and corporate governance, and how firms respond to incidents of 
financial misconduct. We hope this study renews interest in using firm wrongdoing to build 
organizational theory. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 CEO Change 0.307 0.462 1.000
2 Restatement Increased Net Income 0.237 0.426 -0.014 1.000
3 Net Effect of Restatement -4.974 13.095 -0.007 0.8641* 1.000
4 Restatement Due to Fraud 0.097 0.296 0.063 -0.093 -0.1055* 1.000
5 Restatement Resulted in a Lawsuit 0.348 0.477 0.038 -0.039 -0.035 0.2410* 1.000
6 Number of Firms Restating, Prior Year 52.260 15.600 0.067 -0.082 -0.049 -0.1430* -0.090 1.000
7 Firm Size 5.245 2.487 0.001 -0.047 -0.035 0.1214* 0.1124* 0.023
8 S&P 500 0.246 0.431 0.029 0.014 0.022 -0.028 0.1773* 0.045
9 Earnings Per Share 0.130 4.677 -0.088 -0.008 -0.043 -0.043 -0.1633* -0.051
10 Logged CEO compensation 7.894 1.277 -0.013 -0.023 0.032 -0.012 0.1410* 0.079
11 CEO age 54.580 7.639 -0.1318* -0.048 -0.058 -0.038 -0.072 0.070
12 CEO age squared 3037.091 851.182 -0.1306* -0.047 -0.060 -0.028 -0.060 0.060
13 Reason for leaving: Resigned 0.406 0.493 0.161 -0.034 -0.019 0.034 0.107 -0.070
14 Reason for leaving: Retired 0.462 0.501 -0.084 0.131 0.123 -0.005 -0.146 0.081
15 Reason for leaving: Other 0.113 0.318 -0.074 -0.122 -0.114 -0.024 0.055 -0.065
16 Board size 6.546 1.582 0.005 -0.013 -0.032 0.040 0.2855* -0.069
17 Post-Sarbanes-Oxley 0.481 0.500 0.1921* -0.048 -0.081 -0.2087* -0.1997* 0.2742*
18 Any Restatement Media Coverage (dummy) 0.490 0.500 0.1408* -0.1002* -0.1207* 0.091 0.2519* 0.068
19 Restatement Media Coverage (logged) 0.747 1.729 0.1192* 0.003 -0.007 0.077 0.1265* 0.1185*
20 Number of Analysts: Prior Year 5.993 6.053 0.015 0.022 0.009 0.022 0.1396* -0.001
21 Auditor Change 0.124 0.330 0.061 0.032 0.007 -0.008 0.056 -0.017
Variable 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
7 Firm Size 1.000
8 S&P 500 0.2981* 1.000
9 Earnings Per Share -0.024 0.061 1.000
10 Logged CEO compensation 0.2516* 0.3931* 0.051 1.000
11 CEO age -0.092 -0.003 -0.089 0.011 1.000
12 CEO age squared -0.102 -0.011 -0.100 0.9944* 0.000 1.000
13 Reason for leaving: Resigned -0.060 -0.2616* -0.002 -0.3648* 1.000 -0.3606* 1.000
14 Reason for leaving: Retired 0.018 0.1961* 0.060 0.3488* -0.7660* 0.3349* 0.185 1.000
15 Reason for leaving: Other 0.033 0.083 -0.101 0.012 -0.2952* 0.028 0.102 -0.3313*
16 Board size 0.1795* 0.1700* -0.113 -0.104 -0.007 -0.097 0.018 -0.079
17 Post-Sarbanes-Oxley -0.1020* -0.1092* 0.006 0.106 0.043 0.099 -0.002 -0.025
18 Any Restatement Media Coverage (dummy) 0.2152* 0.2999* -0.1074* -0.064 -0.045 -0.071 0.1785* -0.025
19 Restatement Media Coverage (logged) 0.2249* 0.083 0.092 -0.067 0.159 -0.064 0.039 -0.109
20 Number of Analysts: Prior Year 0.2753* 0.4141* -0.060 -0.1303* -0.127 -0.1329* 0.3550* 0.166
21 Auditor Change -0.030 -0.040 -0.087 -0.010 -0.134 -0.013 -0.029 0.085
Variable 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
15 Reason for leaving: Other 1.000
16 Board size 0.122 1.000
17 Post-Sarbanes-Oxley -0.092 -0.1641* 1.000
18 Any Restatement Media Coverage (dummy) 0.120 0.066 0.1687* 1.000
19 Restatement Media Coverage (logged) -0.132 0.2496* 0.012 0.1723* 1.000
20 Number of Analysts: Prior Year -0.042 0.044 -0.0998* 0.2804* 0.049 1.000
21 Auditor Change 0.099 -0.022 0.076 0.015 -0.010 -0.055 1.000
N=260 for variables 10-16, N=412 for all other variables; * p<0.05  
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Table 2: Second-stage Heckman selection models predicting the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley and 
media coverage on the likelihood of CEO Change (logit) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Restatement Increased Net Income 1.081 1.118 1.082 1.057 0.045 0.264 0.060 -0.024
(0.182) (0.192) (0.181) (0.174) (0.303) (0.342) (0.298) (0.315)
Net Effect of Restatement 0.998 0.999 0.998 0.999 -0.005 -0.008 -0.005 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010)
Restatement Due to Fraud 1.312* 1.152 1.295* 1.340** 0.156 -0.032 0.146 0.155
(0.146) (0.124) (0.144) (0.148) (0.238) (0.267) (0.234) (0.244)
Restatement Resulted in a Lawsuit 1.166+ 1.036 1.157+ 1.148+ 0.079 0.248 0.070 0.174
(0.098) (0.081) (0.097) (0.095) (0.183) (0.203) (0.179) (0.196)
Number of Firms Restating, Prior Year 0.999 1.000 0.998 0.998 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Firm Size 0.969 0.954* 0.965+ 0.963+ -0.040 -0.037 -0.041 -0.050
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.045) (0.050) (0.045) (0.040)
S&P 500 1.143 0.956 1.145 1.155 -0.054 0.152 -0.104 0.287
(0.138) (0.103) (0.137) (0.137) (0.281) (0.318) (0.284) (0.309)
Earnings Per Share 0.981+ 0.990 0.982+ 0.980+ -0.0357* -0.039* -0.035* -0.048**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.019)
Logged CEO compensation 0.012 -0.018 -0.003 -0.013
(0.058) (0.069) (0.061) (0.058)
CEO age -0.108 -0.006 -0.062 -0.249+
(0.118) (0.149) (0.132) (0.137)
CEO age squared 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002+
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Reason for leaving: Resigned 0.004 (0.031) (0.029) (0.046)
(0.229) (0.259) (0.232) (0.206)
Reason for leaving: Retired 0.062 -0.047 0.011 0.164
(0.191) (0.227) (0.202) (0.191)
Board size 0.028 0.004 0.013 0.026
(0.055) (0.066) (0.058) (0.055)
Post-Sarbanes-Oxley 1.322** 1.314** 1.222* 0.701*** 0.725*** 0.530**
(0.120) (0.119) (0.115) (0.210) (0.211) (0.203)
Restatement Media Coverage (logged) 1.026 1.023 0.976 0.008 0.028 -0.070
(0.019) (0.018) (0.026) (0.042) (0.038) (0.044)
Post-SOX x Restatement Media (logged) 1.082* 0.196***
(0.036) (0.058)
Constant 1.852+ 3.353*** 1.958+ 2.151* 6.631+ -0.324 6.285 9.966**
(0.676) (1.102) (0.716) (0.780) (3.850) (3.779) (3.832) (3.853)
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Lambda 1.124 0.846 1.118 1.092 0.177 0.307 0.094 0.490
Observations 412 412 412 412 260 260 260 260
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1  
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Table 3: Logistic regression models predicting the effect of media coverage on CEO 
Change  
 
   (1) (2) (3) 
Restatement Increased Net Income -0.014 -0.008 -0.011 
   (0.523) (0.520) (0.527) 
Net Effect of Restatement  0.004 0.002 0.004 
   (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Restatement Due to Fraud 0.613+ 0.634+ 0.582 
   (0.354) (0.365) (0.363) 
Restatement Resulted in a Lawsuit 0.175 0.201 0.118 
  (0.253) (0.261) (0.256) 
Number of Firms Restating, Prior Year 0.002 -0.001 0.000 
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Firm Size -0.085 -0.093 -0.107 
  (0.072) (0.073) (0.073) 
S&P 500 0.220 0.326 0.202 
  (0.312) (0.300) (0.315) 
Earnings Per Share -0.044 -0.050 -0.044 
   (0.033) (0.034) (0.032) 
Any Restatement Media Coverage (dummy) 0.468+    0.426+ 
   (0.255)    (0.259) 
Restatement Media Coverage (logged)    0.159* 0.150* 
      (0.069) (0.069) 
Constant -6.446** -6.916** -5.994* 
  (2.397) (2.359) (2.414) 
Industry FE YES YES YES 
Time trend YES YES YES 
Observations 407 407 407 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Table 4: Second-stage Heckman selection models predicting the likelihood of auditor 
change, and predicting CEO Change with restricted windows 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Restatement Increased Net Income 1.183 0.883 0.122 -0.178 0.295 0.493
(0.153) (0.158) (0.173) (0.332) (0.201) (0.760)
Net Effect of Restatement 0.994 0.998 -0.004 0.001 -0.009 -0.021
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.023)
Restatement Due to Fraud 1.025 0.989 0.299* 0.247 0.284* -0.050
(0.089) (0.139) (0.122) (0.231) (0.139) (0.399)
Restatement Resulted in a Lawsuit 1.099 0.890 0.235* 0.216 0.285** 0.448
(0.072) (0.095) (0.097) (0.193) (0.108) (0.347)
Number of Firms Restating, Prior Year 0.999 1.001 -0.003 0.004 -0.006* -0.008
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.012)
Firm Size 0.997 0.952+ -0.025 -0.014 -0.028 -0.039
(0.015) (0.026) (0.020) (0.040) (0.020) (0.068)
S&P 500 1.090 1.220 0.207 0.090 0.311+ 0.206
(0.101) (0.209) (0.136) (0.319) (0.172) (0.557)
Earnings Per Share 0.984* 0.989 -0.014 0.013 -0.032+ -0.023
(0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.031) (0.016) (0.050)
Logged CEO compensation 0.984 -0.071 0.049
(0.036) (0.056) (0.110)
CEO age 0.990 -0.151 -0.493
(0.083) (0.191) (0.422)
CEO age squared 1.000 0.001 0.004
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
Reason for leaving: Resigned 1.001 -0.306 -0.223
(0.139) (0.205) (0.333)
Reason for leaving: Retired 0.936 -0.002 0.118
(0.116) (0.210) (0.344)
Board size 0.948 0.000 -0.033
(0.033) (0.060) (0.134)
Post-Sarbanes-Oxley 1.118 1.012 0.222 1.039*** 0.090 0.670
(0.081) (0.096) (0.148) (0.242) (0.175) (0.444)
Restatement Media Coverage (logged) 1.032 1.002 -0.029 -0.020 -0.028 -0.208
(0.021) (0.028) (0.027) (0.044) (0.033) (0.145)
Post-SOX x Restatement Media (logged) 0.963 0.998 0.088* 0.149** 0.092* 0.324*
(0.025) (0.037) (0.035) (0.054) (0.040) (0.147)
Constant 0.944 5.054 -0.261 10.43+ -2.381 15.740
(0.265) (11.480) (1.494) (5.472) (1.807) (13.400)
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
Lambda 1.238+ 0.959 0.222 0.455 0.412+ 0.695
Observations 412 260 378 238 334 211
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
6 months +/- SOXAuditor Change
CEO Change, Excluding Restatements
3 months +/- SOX
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Figure 1. The accounting scandals of 2001-2002 as a focusing event leading up to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley 
 
Note: Bars represent the absolute number of restatements by exchange-listed firms during our study period. Of the largest 20 ever 
bankruptcies in U.S. history, 5 took place prior to 2007 (the end of our study period) and were a direct result of fraud. Note that three 
happened within the 18-month period from December 2001 to July 2002. Prior to this period there had not been a bankruptcy due to 
fraud of similar magnitude since Financial Corporation of America filed for Chapter 11 in 1988.
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Figure 2. Proposed model of relationships among legislative change, media attention to 
wrongdoing, and CEO turnover 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The predicted likelihood of CEO replacement as a function of Restatement Media 
Coverage, pre- and post- Sarbanes-Oxley 
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